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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
INSURANCE LAW

Ins. Law § 167(8): Insurer'sunexplained 2-month delay in disclaiming liability held unreasonable as a matter of law
An insured generally has an obligation under a liability insurance policy to inform its carrier of a claim as soon as is "reasonably
possible. 21 2 Similarly, to deny coverage an insurance carrier is required under section 167(8) of the Insurance Law to inform the
insured of its disclaimer in writing "as soon as is reasonably possible" after receiving notice of the claim or forfeit the privilege to
disclaim.2 6 3 Absent "extreme" circumstances, the timeliness of an
122

See N.Y. INs. LAw § 167(1)(d) (McKinney 1966). Although most liability policies

contain time limits within which the insured must give notice of an occurrence, the provision
is abrogated by § 167(1) (d)"if it shall be shown not to have been reasonably possible to give
such notice within the prescribed time and that notice was given as soon as was reasonably
possible." Id.
Although an insured's "failure to satisfy the notice requirement vitiates the policy,"
Security Mut. Ins. Co. v. Acker-Fitzsimons Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 436, 440, 293 N.E.2d 76, 78, 340
N.Y.S.2d 902, 905 (1972), the timeliness of a carrier's disclaimer nevertheless must be reasonable in order to be effective. As stated by the second department:
Where the carrier itself has unreasonably delayed in making a disclaimer as a result
of its own failure to make diligent efforts to comply with its own responsibilities
and obligations under the policy of insurance, it cannot take advantage of a failure
to give timely notice of accident.
Safeguard Ins. Co. v. Trent, 29 App. Div. 2d 780, 781, 287 N.Y.S.2d 894, 896 (2d Dep't 1968)
(citations omitted); accord, Cohen v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 896, 264
N.Y.S.2d 807 (2d Dep't 1965); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Schaefers, 47 Misc. 2d 522, 262 N.Y.S.2d
953 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965). See also Kelly v. MVAIC, 30 App. Div. 2d 516, 290 N.Y.S.2d
5 (1st Dep't 1968).
The reasonableness of the insured's delay in notifying the carrier of an accident is usually
a question of fact taking into consideration the presence of "mitigating circumstances such
as absence from the state or lack of knowledge of the occurrence or its seriousness." Deso v.
London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 3 N.Y.2d 127, 129-30, 143 N.E.2d 889, 890, 164 N.Y.S.2d
689, 691 (1957) (citations omitted). A good-faith belief of nonliability may be sufficient to
excuse an insured's otherwise untimely notice, Empire City Subway Co. v. Greater N.Y. Mut.
Ins. Co., 35 N.Y.2d 8, 315 N.E.2d 775, 358 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1974), as may the insured's infancy.
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 69 Misc. 2d 1020, 322 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. Erie
County 1972). An unreasonable delay is not excused if due to the insured's negligence or
forgetfulness, Reina v. United States Cas. Co., 228 App. Div. 108, 239 N.Y.S. 196 (1st Dep't
1930), affl'd, 256 N.Y. 537, 177 N.E. 130 (1931), or to an unawareness of coverage. Lloyd v.
MVAIC, 23 N.Y.2d 478, 245 N.E.2d 216, 297 N.Y.S.2d 563 (1969); Kauffman v. MVAIC, 25
App. Div. 2d 419, 266 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1st Dep't 1966); Mason v. Allstate Ins. Co., 12 App. Div.
2d 138, 209 N.Y.S.2d 104 (2d Dep't 1960).
ImSection 167(8) provides:
If under a liability policy delivered or issued for delivery in this state, an insurer
shall disclaim liability or deny coverage for death or bodily injury arising out of a
motor vehicle accident or any other type of accident occurring within this state, it
shall give written notice as soon as is reasonably possible of such disclaimer of
liability or denial of coverage to the insured and the injured person or any other
claimant.
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insurer's disclaimer notice has been treated as a question of fact.264
Recently, in Hartford Insurance Co. v. County of Nassau,26 5 the
Court of Appeals held that despite an insured's almost 4-year delay
in notifying its insurer of a claim, a wait of 2 months in disclaiming
liability was unreasonable as a matter of law where the insurer did
not offer an explanation for the delay. 66
In Hartford, defendant County of Nassau notified its insurance
carrier, Hartford Insurance Co. (Hartford), of an accident more than
45 months after the mishap. 27 Hartford then sent a letter to the
county within 2 weeks in which it agreed to defend subject to a
reservation of any available rights .26 8 Without giving notice of intent

to disclaim, the insurer sought a declaration of its obligations under
N.Y. INs. LAW § 167(8) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
This section was enacted as part of the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation Law. Ch. 759, § 3, [1958] N.Y. Laws 1624 (McKinney). Since the liability of the Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) may be triggered by an insurer's
valid disclaimer, see N.Y. INs. LAw §§ 601(b), 608(a) & 620 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 19781979), the section represents a concern for the MVAIC and injured party about the effects of
a disclaimer. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gross, 27 N.Y.2d 263, 267, 265 N.E.2d 736, 737, 317 N.Y.S.2d
309, 311 (1970); MVAIC v. Eisenberg, 18 N.Y.2d 1, 218 N.E.2d 524, 271 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1966);
Olenick v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 68 Misc. 2d 764, 328 N.Y.S.2d 50 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1971), modified, 42 App. Div. 2d 760, 346 N.Y.S.2d 320 (2d Dep't 1976); see
Ch. 759, § 2, [1958] N.Y. Laws 1624 (McKinney). Only in 1975 was the provision amended
to embrace accidents not involving a motor vehicle. Ch. 775, § 1, [1975] N.Y. Laws 1208
(McKinney). Implicit in the amendment is the concern for an injured party to be able to
recover a judgment in full. See General Accident Ins. Group v. Cirucci, 46 N.Y.2d 862, 387
N.E.2d 223, 414 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1979); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. North Country Motors,
Ltd., 57 App. Div. 2d 158, 393 N.Y.S.2d 799 (3d Dep't 1977). See also Jackson v. Citizens
Cas. Co., 277 N.Y. 385, 14 N.E.2d 446 (1938).
26, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gross, 27 N.Y.2d 263, 270, 265 N.E.2d 736, 739, 317 N.Y.S.2d 309,
314 (1970); accord, Long Island Ins. Co. v. Alini, 62 App. Div. 2d 1038, 404 N.Y.S.2d 40 (2d
Dep't 1978); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. DeLosh, 73 Misc. 2d 275, 277, 341 N.Y.S.2d 465, 467
(Sup. Ct. St. Lawrence County 1973). Interpreting § 167(8), the Gross Court declared:
The statute lays down an unconditional rule. It requires, however, as a foundation,
unreasonableness as a standard for delay, which means simply that no particular
time is deemed undue delay. Rather the question of unreasonableness becomes a
question of fact, or if extreme, of law, depending upon the circumstances of the case
which make it reasonable for the insurer to take more or less time to make, complete, and act diligently on its investigation of its coverage or breach of conditions
in its policy.
27 N.Y.2d at 270, 265 N.E.2d at 739, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 314. See generally Interboro Mut.
Indem. Ins. Co. v. Miles, 48 App. Div. 2d 751, 368 N.Y.S.2d 333 (3d Dep't 1975).
26546 N.Y.2d 1028, 389 N.E.2d 1061, 416 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1979), rev'g 64 App. Div. 2d 604,
406 N.Y.S.2d 362 (2d Dep't 1978).
26 46 N.Y.2d at 1029-30, 389 N.E.2d at 1062, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
26,Id. at 1029, 389 N.E.2d at 1062, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 540. The defendant contended the
delay was due to its unawareness that the policy covered the claim. 64 App. Div. 2d at 604,
406 N.Y.S.2d at 363; see note 262 supra.
266 46 N.Y.2d at 1031, 389 N.E.2d at 1063, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 541 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
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the policy 2 months after learning of the accident. 2 9 Based upon the
parties' stipulation of fact, the Supreme Court, Nassau County,
ordered the insurer to defend the county in the pending tort litigation and indemnify the insured for any ensuing judgment. 2 ° The
Appellate Division, Second Department, unanimously reversed,
finding the insurer's obligation under the policy discharged by the
county's unreasonable delay in notifying the insurer.2 The court
also noted that Hartford's disclaimer was not unreasonable as a
22
matter of law. 1
Reversing in a memorandum opinion, 273 the Court of Appeals
reasoned that, in the absence of an explanation, the insurer's 2month delay in disclaiming liability was unreasonable as a matter
of law. 274 Initially, the majority observed that the letter reserving the
insurer's privilege to disclaim did not constitute an effective notice
of disclaimer. 27 51 Assuming, without deciding, that the carrier's
commencement of the declaratory judgment action was equivalent
to a notice of disclaimer, 28 the Court acknowledged that a 2-month
delay in disclaiming liability could be justified under certain circumstances.2 7 The majority emphasized, however, that Hartford's
failure to avail itself of the opportunity to offer an explanation for
Id. at 1029, 389 N.E.2d at 1062, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
2' Id. at 1028, 389 N.E.2d at 1061, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 539-40.
21164 App. Div. 2d 604, 406 N.Y.S.2d 362 (2d Dep't 1978).
72 Id., 406 N.Y.S.2d at 363.
" 46 N.Y.2d at 1031, 389 N.E.2d at 1064, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 542. Chief Judge Cooke and
Judges Gabrielli, Jones, Wachtler, and Fuchsberg concurred in the memorandum. Judge
Jasen dissented in a separate opinion.
21 Id. at 1030, 389 N.E.2d at 1063, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
*15Id. at 1029, 389 N.E.2d at 1062, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 541; accord,Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gross,
27 N.Y.2d 263, 265 N.E.2d 736, 317 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1970); Wright v. Wright, 35 App. Div. 2d
895, 315 N.Y.S.2d 710 (3d Dep't 1970). The courts have viewed such letters as "self-serving
devices . . .to benefit the carrier and disadvantage the insured." Kasson & Keller, Inc. v.
Centennial Ins. Co., 79 Misc. 2d 450, 453, 359 N.Y.S.2d 760, 764 (Sup. Ct. Montgomery
County 1974).
27 46 N.Y.2d at 1029, 389 N.E.2d at 1062, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 541. Some courts have deemed
the commencement of a declaratory judgment action by the insurer to determine the obligations of the parties as satisfying the statutory requirement of a written disclaimer. See, e.g.,
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Frank, 57 App. Div. 2d 950, 951, 394 N.Y.S.2d 902, 903 (2d Dep't 1977),
rev'd on othergrounds mem., 44 N.Y.2d 897, 379 N.E.2d 222, 407 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1978); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dimino, 40 App. Div. 2d 1076, 339 N.Y.S.2d 218 (4th Dep't 1972). But see
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Manger, 30 Misc. 2d 326, 332, 213 N.Y.S.2d 901, 908 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1961). One court has found the statutory disclaimer requirement of written notice
satisfied by the insurer's commencement of a declaratory judgment action when a default
judgment was entered, notwithstanding that the insured never had actual knowledge of the
disclaimer. Royal Indem. Co. v. Kay, 48 Misc. 2d 1086, 266 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1966).
2 46 N.Y.2d at 1029, 389 N.E.2d at 1062, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
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the delay precluded it from denying liability.
Dissenting, Judge Jasen observed that, absent extreme circumstances, the reasonableness of the delay is a question of fact and
argued that the stipulated facts in Hartford did not merit the conclusion that the delay was unreasonable as a matter of law. 279 Judge
Jasen maintained that the insured's delay in notifying its carrier of
the accident required additional time to investigate and evaluate
the claim.2o Finally, since the parties agreed to the facts, the dissent
should be afforded a
stressed that, at the very least, the insurer
281
further opportunity to explain the delay.
The Hartford decision appears to indicate a willingness to disregard the dilatory conduct of an insured when evaluating the reasonableness of an insurer's delay in disclaiming liability.2 2 The decision seems justified where the basis of the disclaimer is a policy
provision requiring prompt notice of an occurrence, since the insurer
usually will be aware of its reason for disclaiming at the time it
receives the belated notice of the claim.2 83 Of course, where a disclaimer is not based upon untimely notice, all factors, including an
of an ininsured's delay, should be corisidered in an evaluation
284
surer's explanation for failing to disclaim promptly.
"8 Id. at 1030, 389 N.E.2d at 1063, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
17 Id. at 1031, 389 N.E.2d at 1063, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 542 (Jasen, J., dissenting).

Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).

Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
While an insurer cannot use an insured's untimely notice as a defense to explain an
W
unreasonable delay in disclaiming, see note 262 supra,the delay from the date of the accident
to the time of notice may present the insurer with difficulties in investigating the claim and
to this extent may be a mitigating factor in some cases. See Interboro Mut. Indem. Co. v.
Miles, 48 App. Div. 2d 751, 368 N.Y.S. 2d 333 (3d Dep't 1975); note 283 infra.
I Since an insured's long delay in providing notice sometimes will be reasonable, see
note 262 supra, the insurer will not necessarily have a basis for denying coverage. In these
few situations, an insurer would not be justified in disclaiming upon receipt of the insured's
notice. Nevertheless, these cases should not be problematical as the insurer generally will be
able to identify claims falling within this class. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Bush, 46 App. Div. 2d 958, 362 N.Y.S.2d 220 (3d Dep't 1974).
24 See note 283 supra. In dissent, Judge Jasen noted that section 167(8) "requires
'unreasonableness' as a standard for delay." 46 N.Y.2d at 1030, 389 N.E.2d at 1063, 416
N.Y.S.2d at 541 (Jasen, J., dissenting). This statement would appear to be more applicable
where a carrier's basis for disclaiming is other than the insured's delay. Where the disclaimer
is based on the insured's delay, the insurer should be required to send its notice within a short
and specific time period. Other bases for disclaiming would include instances where the
policy excludes coverage of claims of a certain nature. See, e.g., Fitzsimmons v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 16 Misc. 2d 972, 185 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. Steuben County 1959) (workmen's
compensation); Joyce Apartments, Inc. v. Weinstock, 15 Misc. 2d 47, 181 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1958) (intentional torts). In such cases, an insured's delay in notifying
its carrier could compound the difficulties of an insurer in discovering the existence of a basis
28
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Additionally, in clarifying the extreme facts and circumstances
that can justify deeming a delay unreasonable as a matter of law,
Hartford apparently has increased the insurer's burden to make an
early disclaimer.2 5 As a result, the decision may provoke premature
disclaimers of liability by insurers seeking to avoid the risk of subsequent court orders compelling them to defend and indemnify an
insured who otherwise could be denied coverage by a valid disclaimer.28s The Hartford decision seems justified, however, by the
policy considerations and legislative intent underlying section
167(8) that disputed obligations to defend and indemnify be expeditiously resolved. 2 7 Moreover, an insurance company will not be
deemed to have waived its privilege to disclaim following a delay
exceeding 2 months where such insurer is able to offer an explanation other than the dilatory conduct of an insured.
Richard L. O'Toole
for disclaiming coverage. Thus, "additional time" may be required in these instances. See
46 N.Y.2d at 1031, 389 N.E.2d at 1063, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 542 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
2 See 46 N.Y.2d at 1031, 389 N.E.2d at 1063, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 542 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Viewed narrowly, Hartford merely imposes an affirmative duty on the insurer to explain the
reasons underlying any delay in disclaiming. Even if this be the case, Hartfordcategorically
mandates that 2-month unexplained delays will not be tolerated. Thus, the Hartford Court
has imposed an absolute limit on the amount of time afforded an insurance company in which
to disclaim where no explanation is offered.
1 See 46 N.Y.2d at 1031, 389 N.E.2d at 1063, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 542. (Jasen, J., dissenting). When an insurer disclaims liability, a genuine controversy is created, allowing a declaratory judgment action to establish the parties' rights before the tort action is tried. Brooklyn
Yarn Dye Co. v. Empire State Warehouses Corp., 276 App. Div. 611, 96 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d
Dep't 1950); Birnbaum v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 54 Misc. 2d 72, 281 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1966).
2 The Hartford decision represents a judicial cognizance of the potential liability of
MVAIC. In an effort to maximize MVAIC's effectiveness in adequately defending and indemnifying a person uninsured by reason of an insurer's valid disclaimer of liability, the Court
may have sought to accelerate the surfacing of such claims under MVAIC by compelling the
carrier to either disclaim quickly or at least explain the reasons underlying the delay. See
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gross, 27 N.Y.2d 263, 267, 265 N.E.2d 736, 737, 317 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311
(1970). Since section 167(8) applies to all types of liability policies, the Hartford decision is
not restricted to accidents involving motor vehicles.

